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ABSTRACT 
Although there is considerable interest in planning for particular 
rural areas, (area -"based planning) in East Africa, past ex-
perience h a s "been discouraging. The common experience of planning 
w i t h o u t implementation has taken three main forms: target dis-
aggregation; the preparation fo shopping lists; and development 
studies w h i c h do not lead to action. In the meantime there has 
been m u c h implementation without area-based planning. Two 
exceptions have been settlement schemes and the SRDP. The 
experience of the latter to date suggests that with present 
p r o c e d u r e s , injections of high-level staff are necessary for plan 
preparation and implementation; that this reflects much less on 
the capability of field staff than on the circumstances in which 
they find themselves; that the main administrative bottleneck is 
in Nairobi; and that implement ability is the crux of good 
p l a n n i n g . 
Common diagnoses of the problems involved and of prescrip-
tions to deal w i t h them include inappropriate structures of 
organisations, lack of coordination, lack of entrepreneurial 
and problem-solving attitudes in the civil service, and lack of 
trained m a n p o w e r . The paper questions each of these diagnoses, 
commonly m a d e in both Kenya and Tanzania, and also the con-
siderable attention which has been given to social factors in 
administration, and argues rather that if area-based planning is 
desirable it can best be achieved through the design and testing 
of experimental procedures through a combination of research, 
consultancy and. training. 
INTRODUCTION: 
The 1970s have begun with mounting interest in 
decentralising planning and in preparing-and -implementing 
plans.for specific rural areas in East Africa. In Uganda 
an interministerial .committee has been set up for a 
proposed programme for integrated rural development for 
18 separate gombololas.. In Tanzania decentralisation has 
been sought through the Regional Development: Fund and 
-through;the intended work of Regional Economic Secretaries^ 
In addition, the programme
(
 of encouraging movement into 
u.jamaa villages in Dodoma amounts to an attempt at a com-
prehensive area development programme (Rwegayura, 1971) 
w h i c h might become a prototype, for similar endeavours 
elsewhere. There ^has been much recent. discussion of re-
gional planning in Tanzania (for instance Saylor and 
L i v i n g s t o n e , 1969? Berry and ;others, .1971; and Tomecko and 
D a v i e s , 1971) and the third volume of the Second Eive Year 
P l a n w a s devoted to an attempt to decentralise and dis-
aggregate to the regional level (Tanzania Government, 1970). 
In K e n y a , regional, physical plans have been ©completed or 
are nearly complete for the seven provinces; the Special 
Rural Development Programme (SRDP) has generated multi-
:
 sectoral programmes for six divisions (sub-districts) and 
preparatory studies for several others; and: the Ndegwa 
Commission has recommended that both plan-making • and plan-
implementing be extended down to the level of .the district 
and even of the division (Kenya Government, 1971a:112). 
While this is by no means a f u l l review of. the 
interest in developing decentralised planning, i t may serve 
to justify the attempt which follows to assess some of the 
experience gained in the 1960s.. ana. more recently, to exa-
m i n e explanations for the levels of performance achieved, 
• a n d to derive prescriptions for the future. In doing this 
j i t is necessary to narrow the'field of concern. Decentra-
lised planning presents a complex network of problems and 
opportunities which it is not within the competence of any 
one discipline to handle. This paper does not consider in 
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any detail either regional physical planning.or. sectoral 
planning for, for instance, roads, water,"or"agrTculture 
at decentralised levels. It is coneerneirather with area-
based planning, defined a s planning and plan implementa-
tion with participation by local-level staff
1
 of multi-
sector programmes for- specific rural areas. The m a i n 
focus is on the district and sub-district levels."
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 Most 
attention'is paid to Tanzania and Kenya: to Tanzania 
because it is relatively well-documented; and 'to Kenya 
because Df the experience gained with the SRDP (for example 
Nellis and others, 1970; Chambers, 1970; Kang'ela, 1971; 
Gerhart,
:;
'1971; Hungate, 1971->f" '-'-'• -o -
-'>
;
 -. A •"-fur'ther'
!
 limit at i oh'bf •"scopemust'be made' 'explicit. 
•This is that this paper does not confront the question of 
alternatives to area-based planning.- It is'all too easy 
to-make the facile assumption that any planning is better 
" than ho planning. •. A decision to plan is,'however , a 
decision to use planning resources and in "intention at 
least, resources for implementation, and 'these have oppor-
tunity costs. Important questions, to be answered only 
in"terms ef the particular conditions of particular nations 
'and the national priorities which they set, are first, 
•'•what forms ^of planning at what levels are desirable, and 
second, a question-which is rarely or never put in East 
Africa,
 :
 Whether 'in some circumstances non-planning may 
be preferable-to plaxming. The justification f of " "omitting 
these questions -here is that answering them "will be easier 
when the feasibility of one of the alternatives'," "area-based 
planning, has been explored in more detail. Such explora-
tion, coneeriied-primarily with administrative" aspects, is 
the purpose of this paper. 
PLANNING- WITHOUT IMPLEMENTATION ' 
Area-based planning and implementation in East Africa 
has a long'record of failure which has, however., been in-
conspicuous, partly because ot
 :
its dispersed nature. - The 
.impression from the evidence
:
available is that many, area-
abased rural development activities fall -into two ma;in 
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categories: planning without implementation; and implemen-
. . ;' tation without planning. While any attempt at summary in-
evitably -oversimplifies, the former category appears to 
include three-main types of operations: target-setting; 
preparing shopping lists; and development studies. •'•'"-'• 
Target-setting was much discussed during the'mid-
1960s. The idea current was that the activities and effec-
. •-. tiveness of local-level staff could be e n h a n c e d t h r o u g h 
- disaggregating to local levels some of the targets set in 
• national plans. In Kenya, the first development plan 
» . stated that the Government would define regional and dist-
rict targets as soon as.possible (Kenya Government, 1964: 
•:--;- 136} and President Kenyatta told a development seminar for 
politicians and civil servants in 1965 that civil servants' 
merits would be judged by their contribution to the deve-
lopment plan and they would be called U p o n to explain any 
failure to achieve their targets (Kenya Institute for 
Administration, 1965). The second development plan set 
agricultural production targets by district' for some of 
the m a i n crops but .these were given for the'end of the 
five year period and not broken down into annual totals 
.'.(Kenya Government, 1966, appendix tables 10 - 21). In 
fact only the Ministry of Agriculture was able to provide 
district targets during the period up to"the end of 1968 
" (Gertzel, 1970:14) and it is doubtful whether these were 
often.taken very seriously. In Tanzania more was attemp-
.. t e d . During the first five year plan period "sectoral tar-
gets were disaggregated to the regions but the regions were 
a l l set the same sectoral growth rates as the nation as 
-a whole (Karmiloff, 1965:86). •• The unrealistic assumptions 
of this procedure coupled with the almost complete absence 
of a professional -economic planning competence at regional 
levels made this a largely meaningless exercise. 'Crop pro-
duction targets were produced after some consultation with 
Regional Development' Committees
1
 and other bodies and were 
- meant to be disaggregated from-regional to district level. 
There-, w e r e , however-, differences'Of opinion whether thrgets 
.were realistic and, as Cliffe and Saul have pointed out, 
the regional planning of'which this was the major component 
w a s largely a paper exercise (1969:34 - 35). In some cases 
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local "bodies, full of initial enthusiasm, set high agricul-
tural production targets for themselves (Bienen, 1967:328 -
.329) and these became translated through non-technical 
channels into calls to increase acreages, regardless of 
Habour constraints at peak periods and of the Ministry of 
Agriculture's policies of propagating better methods of 
husbandry to increase-yields rather than increase acreages. 
In the event the targets were not always known at the local 
level, and where known do not appear, to have had much mean-
ing in terms of staff activity and performance. As a result 
of the intervention of exogenous factors such as weather 
and world prices, some areas exceeded and others fell sh»rt 
of their targets. In addition, procedures had not been 
worked out for reporting on progress. The target approach, 
indeed, had never been thoroughly worked out as a system, 
and amounted to little more than.a crude and ineffective 
attempt to provide local-level staff with an incentive for 
higher performance in the administrative areas in which 
they were working. Following these discouraging'experiences, 
it is not surprising that in the later 1960s target-setting 
lost some of its earlier prominence. 
The second form of planning without implementation 
was the preparation of shopping lists of proposals. In 
Kenya in 1963-64 during the period of regionalism, a number 
of regional agricultural plans which were in' effect project 
lists were submitted to Government.. Again, in preparation 
for the second national plan districts .submitted compila-
tions of programmes and projects but these"., like/the re-
gional agricultural plans before them were regarded with 
despair by central government staff and were not incor-
porated in the planning process. In Tanzania there have 
been similar .experiences: the Mwanza, Dodoma and MbeyaT> 
plans produced in preparation for the second five year plan 
have been described as "essentially.shopping lists" and 
contained, some unrealistic, assumptions in relation to nat-
ional targets and financial availability .(Berry and others, 
1971: 25-26). In practice, "bettom-up" planning ef this 
sort has been a competition -between areas for. resources. 
'Far from.simplifying central planning, the tendency has 
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been ' to overbid in relation to likely resource avai-
lability, to complicate the tasks in the centre, making 
the .locally prepared planj difficult to u s e , and to cont-
ribute to disillusion and cynicism among field staff when 
their efforts lead to no result. 
A third form Of planning without implementation 
comprises development studies which s t op'short" of detailed 
action proposals and which would require further working 
•.. u p before they could "become implement able. In Kenya, • 
development studies carried out- in 1970-71 by Norwegian 
planners in Kitui District fall into this category. They 
compile information about the district and present gene-
_ _ r a l proposals for development, but they do not include 
detailed proposals with programming and costingi---' Studies 
r conducted in-the eight second phase SRDP areas in Kenya to 
varying degrees also have not be'en carried through into 
detailed proposals (For some of the data collected, see 
H-eyer,- Ireri and Moris, 1971). In Tanzania, the Geita 
District Plan prepared by a French team with'
:
 Devplan' per-
sonnel has been described as "essentially a compilation 
. of data regarding the-'dis\rict--rather than a planning docu-
:
 ment" (Saylor and Livingstone,'
1
1969:8), and"' the Kilimanjaro 
- plan prepared by the regional planning team of Devplan has 
been said to provide data and perspectives for"the formu-
lation ..of a plan but not •. to attempt to design an implemen-
_.,;. table programme (Berry and others, 1971:24).' The most ex-
treme example of studies without proposals "is the work 
carried cut in Rungwe District by the Afrika §tudiecentrum, 
.Icydsn, which absorbed 155 man months of highly qualified " 
research staff and on the practical side (however valuable 
the studies may be academically) apparently produced little 
more than a "tentative list of feasibility studies" (Berry 
..hiand others, 1971:24 and 41) r It would, Of course, be un-
.fair.to ignore the"fact that some' studies, like those in 
Rungwe, are conducted wit-h largely academic aims, or that 
the. findings': from such'studies do often feed into policy 
-x. -decisions and so have practical results even If they do 
..••••not lead to plans for the areas in which they were carried 
out. Nevertheless these examples, which are by no' means a 
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complete catalogue, do suggest that there has been a waste 
of resources in the past, and that future proposals for 
studies for area-based planning should be scrutinized to 
improve the chances of their leading to implementable 
plans. The need is for carefully devised and enforced 
procedures to reduce the resources required in data colle-
ction and to increase the resources devoted to programming, 
budgeting and implementation. •• 
While there has been area-based planning activity 
without implementation, it is salutary to recognise that 
meanwhile there has been extensive implementation without 
area-based planning, The implementation of departmental 
sectoral programmes, of national policies such as u,jamaa 
viji,1 ini in Tanzania, and of local authority programmes 
have continued and usually grown in scale. . Decentralised 
allocations of funds - for self-help in Kenya, for the 
Regional Development Fund (RDF) in Tanzania, and for the 
district development fund in Uganda before the coup - have 
been spent by and through local level officials,
:
 though 
with mixed results. (See Collins, 1970, for the RDF). 
Meanwhile the groundsweH of self-help, often outside any 
planning process and often in conflict with national prio-
rities (see Mbithi 1970:19 and Anderson 1971:19 for Kenya) 
has pre-empted decisions through the collection of funds 
and through construction work, sometimes in disregard for 
technical criteria (Holmquist, 1970). In practice the real, 
that is implemented, allocation of development resources 
at the local level has been determined not b y s y s t e m a t i c 
area-based planning in which there is.a careful.assessment 
of potential, problems and opportunities, but through a 
mixture of national and departmental priorities, the ideas 
and preferences of individual civil servants, political 
lobbying, pre-emptive self-help, and the relativeocapaci-
ties of departments to execute their policies. For Kenya 
at least it is generally true, in the words of Robert 
Jackson, that "Planning at the grassroots level is 
still largely a formal exercise which has not yetsv.signi-
ficantly affected local development activities which take 
place in spite of planning.'
1
 (Jackson, 1970:199). . 
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P L A N N I N G WITH IMPLEMENTATION
 ; 
There are, however, two types of exception to 
Jackson's generalisation which, in view of the usual 
gap-between planning and implementation at the area 
l e v e l , should be examined. In the first place, settle-
m e n t and ranching schemes ih Kenya', "without a fanfare and 
w i t h o u t being formally described as area-based planning 
or embodied in any documehts which could be described as 
a r e a plans, have-entailed the activities - resource and 
"•human surveys, p h y s i c a l and agricultural planning, in-
frastructural development, the provision of economic and 
w e l f a r e services', £nd the promotion and development of 
institutions - which would be expected in a multi-sectoral 
' a j e a development -programme. The' settlements' of the National 
Irrigation Board- at M w e a , Perkerra and Ahero, the Million-
A c r e Settlement -Scheme, and the group ranching schemes in 
" Masailand have all in common "the" introduction, or the in-
t e n t i o n to introduce, radical economic and social change 
in'specified rural areas. The experience which these 
approaches have gathered may well repay closer" study by 
future designers of area-1 ased planning, but two particular 
• circumstances-should be borne in mind. In'the first place, 
these operations have been accompanied by a change in the 
organisation of land use and in the farmer's or pastoralist's 
relationship w i t h the land,, This has both required and 
-facilitated the second circumstance, a special organisation 
the-National Irrigation Board/ the Department of Settle-
m e n t and the Range Management Division of the" Ministry of 
AgrinTJ?tu.re
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 r e s p e c t i v e l y - with an exceptional degree of 
responsibility for and control over economic'and to a lesser 
'extent social activities and rewards. These "organisations 
h a v e related to and depended upon the Provincial Adminis-
tration and other departments,"but have enjoyed a degree 
of autonomy and power at the local" level" for "which there 
-are no equivalents in the great majority of small-holding 
and* pastoral situations i n Kenya. 
^be second example.is more important since it rep-
• r e g e n t s an attempt to produce and implement area plans 
i n areas which have been and which remain subject to normal 
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administration, working as far as possible through the 
existing machinery of government." The history of the 
SRDP up to mid-1971 has been recorded elsewhere (Nellis 
1970a,_ 1971a). Suffice.it hero .to state that following 
a conference on education, employment and rural develop-
ment held at Kericho in 1966 {the papers of which were 
published as Sheffield, ed., 1967) a long series of ini-
tiatives led in 1968 to the selection and survey of four-
teen divisions (sub-districts) in Kenya considered to be 
representative of small-farming and to a lesser degree 
• 
pastoral conditions, the preparation in 1969 and 1970 ef . 
multi-sectoral and to some extent experimental development 
plans for six of these (Migori in Sauth Nyanza; Vihiga in 
Kakamega; Kapenguria in West Pokot; Tetu.in Nyeri; Mbe're 
in Embu; and parts of Kwale District), the recruitment of 
donors to finance and provide technical assistance for these 
(FAO/SIDA for Migori; USAID for Vihiga; the Dutch Govern-
ment for Kapenguria; none-the Kenya Government in effect-
for Tetu; NORAD for Mbere; and the British for Kwale),= and 
the beginnings of implementation in the first half of 1971. 
The driving force.behind the.programme was at first the 
Ministry of Economic Planning .and Development and is now, 
since the amalgamation of that Ministry with,the Ministry 
of Finance, the Ministry of Finance and Planning. A small 
secretariat in that Ministry has developed a system of 
linkmen in ministries and has worked through, the.Provincial 
Planning Officers, the Provincial Administration,.and the 
operational departments at the central government, province, 
district and division levels to prepare and gain acceptance 
\ 
for the plans and more recently to initiate implementation. 
Officers of the Provincial Administration known as Area 
Coordinators, one to each area, have been charged with coor-
dinating and expediting the programmes. Although it is 
early to assess progress, a good deal e»f experience has 
been gained and some light has been thrown on the problems 
and possibilities of decentralised planning activities in-
volving local-level staff. Historical descriptions cf the 
planning process in five of the six areas (see Oyugi, 1970 
for Migori; Moock, 1970 for Vihiga; Nell is 197.0>, fer Kape-
nguria; Brokensha,. 1970 for Mbere; and Kang
1
 ela, 1971 for Kwale) 
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demonstrate that the sequence of initiatives, the degrees of 
participation by local level staff, and the contributions of 
Nairobi and provincial personnel have varied between areas. 
The patterns and experience have, however, been sufficiently 
similar for seme generalisations to be possible. (Tor a fuller 
presentation of lessons learnt, see Chambers, 1970). Four 
linked aspects appear important for future area planning.' 
Ill the first place, the six area plans were produced 
through repeated injections of initiative and imagination from 
PPOs and N a i r o b i staff. Provincial, district.and divisional 
• 
staff contributed information, ideas and insights but much of * 
the detailed writing up of plans was carried out either by 
people who came from outside the district or by district and 
divisional staff catalysed and encouraged by the presence of 
such p e o p l e . The generation of experimental ideas, their wor-
k i n g U p into programmes, negotiations for their acceptance in 
central government, and then their -implementation, proved to 
require considerably greater inputs of high-level staff time 
and effort than might have been anticipated. The experimental 
programmes - village polytechnics, labour-intensive road 
construction, extension and farm management experiments, maize 
credit, cotton blocks, 4K-clubs, and so on - were only realised 
through substantial assistance from high-level-manpower from 
outside the divisions and districts concerned. . — • 
Secondly, this reflects much less on the capabilities of 
local-level staff than on the environment in which they find 
themselves and their rational responses to it. They are cynical 
about planning: they quote past examples of planning without 
implementation, of initiatives which have stuck in the machine 
i n Nairobi,, and of delays in fund releases even when these are 
routine. They also have a low expectation of being in the same 
post when, any plans they prepare come forward for implementation. 
This is partly because of the expected .duration of processing 
the plans, and partly because of the rates of transfer. In seven 
SKDP districts and divisions surveyed in July 1970, District 
Commissioners had been in their districts for an average of 6-g-
months and District Officers for an average of only 3-5- months. 
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During a little over a year-during which there have been Area 
Coordinators there have been changes in incumbents in four out 
of the six areas. In these circumstances there is a low incen-
tive to learn about an area or to initiate development action 
which will require more than a few months to mature. The focus 
on immediately realisable self-help activities can thus be voider-
stood partly as reflecting a desire by local-level staff for 
useful activity which they can most easily achieve in the short-
term outside the normal operation of government development 
procedures. Local-level staff are thus the captives of a syndrome 
of rapid transfers, low expectations of continuity in post, low 
incentives to initiate longer-term' developmental activities, and 
the expectation that the operation of routine government proce-
dures will be lengthy. 
A third point highlighted by the SRDP experience is that 
the main administrative bottleneck in:the Kenya Government is in 
Nairobi rather than in the field. This had long.been.recognised 
by field officers and part of the purpose of the SRDP, - to sharpen 
ana make more effective the.machinery of government - implies 
attempting to overcome this. It has however recurred with the 
SRDP because of the smallness of the secretariat responsible for 
it and the magnitude of.the difficulties of generating proposals 
and then processing them, whether prepared in central government 
or in the field. Por example, .-when development studies are carried 
out in the field and sent in to the centre without having been 
worked through into action proposals with realistic and detailed 
requests for resources, they present a problem to the secretariat 
which requires effort -and imagination to solve. In the press of 
events it is the better prepared proposals'or those which fit best 
into existing programmes which receive priority. The non-implemen-
tation of plans derives partly from the inappropriate forms in 
which they are presented to the centre, which in turn stems from 
the-difficulties experienced in the centre in innovating stand-
ardised forms in which proposals should be presented so that they 
can slip quickly and easily through the machine. 
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The fourth,"most important and perhaps most obvious lesson 
which. can be derived-from the SRDP experience, as from examples 
of-planning in many countries, is that "implementability ' is the 
crux of good planning.' Indeed improving programme implementa-
tion, is regarded as one Of the main objectives of the SRLP, 
It is doubtful whether a statement like Pratt's about the Tan-
zania Pive Year P l a n , that it was "an able and highly professio-
n a l document" (Pratt, 1967:38) can be justified unless the 
professionalism includes sufficient insight into the conditions 
of implementation for the plan to be put into practice. (See 
l e y s , 1969:273-4 for a discussion of the first Tanzania Pive 
Y e a r Plan's non-implementable character). It should be axio-
matic that a. "good" plan w h i c h cannot be implemented' is -a 
bad p l a n . In the case of SPDP first phase area plans, working 
them from proposals through to scheduled action programmes has 
proved difficult, time-consuming
-
and a sharp discipline in 
feasibility testing .(for details . of the system, . see Belshaw 
and Chambers, 1971).' Working out who does what,-when and how 
ana w i t h y^hat resources..has revealed incompatibilities in 
proposed resource u s e , particularly with agricultural staff 
t i m e , forcing confrontation with choices which would otherwise 
have remained unrecognised and would have been pre-empted by 
the ..structure and-inertia of the situation. Testing implemen-
tability should thus become a part of area-based planning. 
Th-e^ implication-is that planning resources and activities have 
tended to be concentrated on the Earlier activities of the 
sequence of planning - implementing to the neglect of the later 
ones. One reason a a j be that plan documents are sometimes 
felt to represent the ^culmination of planning operations, 
whether on a national or local level, and plan documents do 
n o t normally .include detailed action-programmes. But good 
planning, should include planning implementation. 
COT.HiION DIAGNOSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS .. 
— In the light of the experience with area-based plan-
n i n g without implementation, area-based' planning with....imple-
m e n t a t i o n , and other evidence, some of the more conventio-
n a l -diagnoses and prescriptions for rural development, admini-
stration can now be examined. Low levels of performance in 
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developmental roles are commonly attributed among other 
factors, to inappropriate structures, lack of coordina-
tion, lack of entrepreneurial and problem-solving attitu-
des in the civil service, and lack of trained manpower. 
_These diagnoses and their associated prescriptions will 
be considered in turn. 
Defects in administration are often attributed to 
missing, faulty or inappropriate structures or their in-
correct location in government. Until the later 1960s 
there was much debate in East Africa about ''where planning . 
should be put" - whether in She President's Office, as a 
separate Ministry, or as a department of a. Ministry of 
Finance. Discussion continues about the location of 
certain departments - community development and water 
development in particular - and these tend, in both Kenya 
and Tanzania, to suffer a peripatetic life: the Water Deve-
lopment Department in Tanzania was in three different 
ministries during the preparation of the Northeast Nzega 
Plan (Berry and others, 1971,: 26). Such questions are 
undoubtedly important: as RweyemamU'(1966) has shown, for 
example, there can be a significant structural aspect to 
the absorption of civil servants' energies in inter-agency 
rivalry and conflict. But. the relative importance of such 
questions has perhaps tended to be exaggerated. To borrow 
from a phrase of KangVela's, concentrating attention on 
structural changes in government may be like the man who 
lost his watch.in a dark street and looked for it in his 
bedroom because that was where he could turn the light on. 
It is easy to recommend changes in structure. .Academic 
commentptirs nnd <=Vior
i
t-term consultants^ alike, often not 
understanding in any depth the operations of government 
departments, are easily tempted to suggest macro-organi-
sational changes rather than -micro-adjustments to make the 
system work. Indeed, the fluency with which the Tanzania 
goverrmient changes its ministries and., departments may be a 
..An honourable exception is Action Programs I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 
consultants to the Ndegwa Commission, whose r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 
were procedural as well as structural. 
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symptom- of evasion of the need not for structural change 
but.for means to improve the working of what already exists. 
Applied to area-based planning this argument implies that 
it m a y be less important to create special organisations 
than to .develop procedures for making use of those which 
are already operating. The process of interstitial pene-
tration and catalysis devised for the SRDP, relying on 
incremental modification of procedures and behaviour, may 
be more effective than more visible and more, easily pres-
cribed changes in organisational structure. " . 
The most_eommon diagnosis of weaknesses in rural 
development administration is, however, lack of coordina-
t i o n , typically" followed by a call for more coordination. 
(This is explicit or implicit in Junod, 1969, Cliffe and 
Saul, 196.9; the Ndegwa Commissio'h Report; Pratt, 1967; and 
Berry and Conyers,,1971:12). Certainly many cases can be 
cited (for example, see Juho'd,'.1969) of lack of cooperation 
between staff of .different departments. But "coordination
1
' 
is a vague term and "is in practice used to cover a number 
o
:
f different purposes. It is probably no coincidence that 
calls for coordination come most loudly from departments 
w h i c h are .insecure and need cooperation, such as community 
development, or planning in its early days. Nor is It sur-
prising -that G-ertzel found that District Officers in Kenya 
said w h e n asked , about their developmental work• that- their 
task w a s to "coordinate", but were vague about what was 
involved (1970: fn36). Again, an analysis of the use of 
the term in the paper by Cliffe and Saul on the district 
development front in Tanzania suggests that they use coor-
dination to describe pursuing the socialist strategy which 
they advocate (1969, passim but especially 1 - 2 , 10-12, and 
34 - 36). . 
The very vagueness of the term "coordination" which 
makes it useful to.community developers, planners, District 
Officers in Kenya and socialists in Tanzania alike also 
allows a use of syntax which can be intepreted tc imply that 
m o r e coordination is necessarily beneficial and that maximum 
coordination is best of all. Some quotations may serve to 
illustrate this usage: 
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Cliffe and Saul: The general strategy of the Tanzania lea-
dership has as its most salient features
 M
the 
intention to coordinate as.closely and as 
fruitfully as possible the activities of all 
institutions with a presence in the Tanzania 
countryside" 
"A continuing effort to streamline the func-
tions of (District Development Committees) 
and to maximize effective coordination is 
obviously a major priority" 
(1969: 1 and 34. Their italics) 
Berry and Conyers: Of water development planning - "We envi-
sage that in most cases there will he clo-
se coordination between the planning teams 
and the various ministries at all planning 
stages, so that as wide a group as possible 
are involved in the planning process". 
(1971:12. My italics) 
Ndegwa Commission 
Report "..there is a widespread feeling that co-
ordination of the many aspects' of Government 
activity .must be improved to get maximum 
results....Here we consider the overall pro-:
 blom of structure
 :
to ensure maximum coordi-
. nation of these various organisations towa-
rds meeting the nation's development goals". 
(Kenya Government, 1971a.: 110) 
Implicit in all these statements is the assumption that in 
some respects at least coordination should- be maximised. There 
may.here be a bias, especially in the Tanzanian case, towards 
coordination because of a national preference for cooperative 
activity; indeed there is a harmony of models of human be-
haviour between the ideals of communal production in u jamaa 
villages and the cooperation of the teams of specialists who 
plan and service them. Planners also have a tendency to 
prefer those rural projects (settlement schemes, ranching 
schemes) which from the nature of the combination of'- inputs 
required generate a.need for .coordinated programming and 
implementation (see, for instance, Milliian, 1967)'. '"Such 
preferences should not, however, be allowed to obscure the 
•fact, that coordination is not costless, and that there is 
no general a priori reason why alternatives to coordination 
should always be less:beneficial, by whatever criteria. 
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Coordination has, indeed, in most of its forms, high 
costs in staff time. Coordination is liable to mean meetings, 
staff sitting through discussions which do not concern them, 
and in its more pathological forms listening to speeches, 
failing to make decisions, hiding from responsibility for 
.inactivity behind a group.consensus, • and agreeing on tech-
nically poor programmes.- . Two-related examples may illust-
r a t e the potential costs of-coordination. Collins states 
.(1970:17) that compartmentalism of ministerial operations 
i n the regions i n Tanzania and lack, of cooperation with 
other .agencies limit the effectiveness of. the- Regional Deve-
lopment Committee ;as a .unit for the planned allocation and 
. coordinated implementation of the Regional Development Fund. 
.He finds a certain "technocratic arrogance" in the case of 
cooperation over implementation of RDF projects, as when 
one head of a water development organisation bemoaned, 
'"squandering"' his staff over lots' of small Village schemes. 
Given scarce resources for implementation,, however:, the 
choice here is likely to have- been between- (Uncoordinated) 
c h o o s i n g the technically easiest areas and supplying more 
people with water and (coordinated), choosing the .areas se-
lected on political and other grounds and supplying fewer 
p e o p l e . A second, related example can be' taken from current 
dilemmas in water development.in Kenya. Executive capacity 
and n o t finance is. the- main constraint, as., is suggested bj*
-
the fact that ^Ln 1969/70 of -an: original estimate for deve-
l o p m e n t expenditure «n rural, water; supplies tof K£5 25,000 only 
K £ 2 5 3 , 0 0 0 was-spent (Kenya -Government., 1971b:243) . In design-
i n g water schemes, consultation and coordination at the local 
l e v e l are often, called for,, but they .absorb, the time of the 
engineers who are-the. bottleneck in 'the whole process, and 
therefore have high opportunity costs in terms of total nu-
m b e r s of people, provided with w a t e r . The choice may well 
be.between more coordination and less water, and less coor-
dination and more wafer. 
The implication of this argument, is that coordination 
m a y sometimes be dysfunctional and should be optimised rather 
than maximised. What form it should take - whether the pas-
s i n g «f information, joint planning, development committee 
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meetings, joint field visits, unified reporting systems, 
.or whatever - n e e d s to.be decided upon the merits of par-
ticular cases and .according to explicit criteria! Enough 
should have been said to make it .evident that blanket calls 
for more coordination should be regarded critically and 
broken down into separate activities, the costs and bene-
fits of each of which can then be appraised. In the - case 
of area-based planning the optimal degree of joint activi-
ty between departments varies with circumstances. There 
may be no operational connection and therefore no need for 
coordination between, let us say, a rural domestic water . 
programme and a maize extension programme; but self-help 
dips programmes in Kenya require joint"planning and rep-
lanning between the.local representatives of the Division 
•f Animal Husbandry, the Department of Community Develop-
m e n t , t h e Provincial Administration, and self-help groups. 
A listing of the operations required for a programme such. . 
. as this, including who is responsible f or'" what quickly' iden-
tifies the joint activities required and joint phasing of 
these activities by the.officers concerned should help to 
-cement commitment to the programme (Belshaw and Chambers, 
1971:8-9). Optimal coordination may best be obtained by 
ad hoc cooperative activity based on the stage of planning 
and implementation and, the particular programme- concerned, 
combined with a. standardisation.of procedures to reduce the 
cost of coordination in staff time spent in discussion and 
in the innovation required for working *ut operations in the 
absence of clear guidelines. For* example, Kates has obser-
ved about the .approaches to producing water development plans 
that: " -
"Comparability between plans-has been enhanced when 
the terms-of-reference suggest , a standard set, of sub-
regional units, when major economic and demographic 
projections are centrally provided, and when a common 
set of design standards and assumptions are adopted. 
Building-in consistency this way seems more effective 
than the use of coordinating or liaison committees 
which in practice seldom seem to-function well" (1971: 
7). 
Put another w a y , as a means of securing desirable coordina-
tion, standardisation of procedures may be preferable to 
meetings which have to innovate relationships. 
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i A farther diagnosis and prescription is that civil 
servants lack initiative and should develop entrepreneurial 
qualities. Bienen, for example,' suggests that entrepreneu-
rship is needed on the part of Regional Commissioners in 
Tanzania (1967:332) hut the other side of the coin is that 
the achievement drives of Regional Commissioners have led 
them sometimes to hasty and authoritarian initiation of 
projects and continued support for them even when they are 
economically unviable (Cliffe and Saul, 1969: 6-7)'. The 
i s s u e s here are-not simple. A" model common in commentators' 
minds is-that the civil-service is hidebound with rules 
and regulations and
:
 innovation is only possible through 
^initiatives outside the system. The RIP in Tanzania can 
be seen in this light: the provision of a resource not con-
strained b y a dead weight of controls inhibiting"its u s e . 
.Although-the RDF evidently has benefits, some of Its short-
comings have been associated with the very autonomy of 
resource allocation which is its virtue. (Collins, 1970, 
passim).. In Kenya," extra-system developmental Initiatives 
b y c i v i l iservants have included self-help activities, in 
:this case sometimes taking the form of compulsory' exactions 
of. contributions-.carried out by the Provincial Administra-
tion (Nyangira, 1970:10). In both Tanzania and Kenya, thus, 
extra-system initiative has shown a tendency toward authori-
.tarian forms.. . A preferable approach may be'to modify the 
existing system of procedures so that it provides more scope 
•and r e w a r d s for developmental initiative. 
A related issue here is the tendency" for thinking 
about the role of the civil service, even indeed of the 
.development administration which is desired, in terms of 
problem-solving. Thus the Ndegwa Commission report: "A 
good Civil Service in a developing country must.', .have the 
capacity to identify and solve specific kinds of problems -
problems of inducing and sustaining social and economic 
change in addition to the already formidable task of effi-
cient management of:the services for which it'is now res-
ponsible." (Kenya Government, 1971ai2-3)7 Similarly, Heyer 
in part of her acute' paper on choice'in the ' SRDP planning 
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process writes: "The detailed goals for any particular 
.area are related to its problems, and probably the easiest 
way of formulating goals is through consideration of funda-
mental problems first." (Heyer, 1971:4). In like vein, • 
Berry and others say of the Mwanza, Mbeya and Dodoma plans 
that they "were drawn together from sets of projects sug-
gested by the District Development Committees and Village 
Development Committees and thus clearly contained the 
important problem areas as seen through local eyes" (1971: 
23). But as Drucker has pointed out in the field of mana-
gement, "Results are obtained by exploiting opportunities, 
* 
not by solving problems " (1964:18)7 While this statement 
is oversimple, and while the quotations from the three sour-
ces above do not do the authors full justice, the point is 
not mere semantics. Civil servants can very easily be 
problem-oriented in their attitudes and activities; indeed 
the continuing emphasis on law and order, however neces-
sary, has a problem-preventing and problem-solving character. 
Moreover, the programmes of technical departments ..can be 
biased by uncritical attempts to solve problems. take 
one example, cotton has done consistently badly in Kenya 
'despite repeated efforts to expand acreage; the response 
of the Ministry of Agriculture has been to redouble efforts 
to persuade farmers to grow it rather, than to look for 
alternatives. In cases such as these, resource allocations 
are determined by difficulties that arise.. Par from this al-
ways being the desirable creativity welcomed b y Hirschman as 
part of his theory of the Hiding-Hand in development (Hirsch-
m a n , 1967) it may have high and unjustifiable costs through 
draining effort and resources into activities which are 
less beneficial than their alternatives,. An opportunity-
orientation could be much more productive, In a r e a-based 
planning for instance one of the first steps to be "taken by 
an agriculturalist (as rarely if ever happened with the first 
round of SRDP.planning) would be to visit agricultural re-
search stations to find out what new crop Varieties might 
be available and.what opportunities were presented by re-
search results already obtained. Similarly, in land utili-
sation the emphasis would be on making fuller;use of under-
utilised resources. Activities such as these, innovative 
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-though they are in their implications, could he promoted 
"by m a k i n g them part of standard procedures for area-based 
planning. 
The final diagnosis of the difficulties of decen-
tralised and area-hased planning to he considered here is 
lack of high-level manpower. For Tanzania,- Saylor and 
Livingstone consider the lack of skilled pmanpdwer capable 
of properly planning and evaluating projects to he "perhaps 
the most crucial limiting factor in the sub-national plan-
n i n g process" (1969:17), and Cliffe and Saul describe it 
.{as "among the most unyielding parameters of the current 
situation" (1969:37).- For K e n y a , Belshaw has recently 
-written "Since applied economics competence plus rural 
orientation is a very scarce resource in Kenya., considera-
ble ingenuity in resource use will be required if district 
planning is to b e p r o d u c t i v e activity": (1971:9-10). 
•Certainly in Tanzania and Kenya there has been difficulty 
over a number of years in recruiting suitably qualified 
Regional Economic Secretaries and Provincial Planning 
Officers respectively. Moreover, in Kenya there seems no 
prospect of. early-recruitment and training of the District 
Development Officers and.District Planning Officers reco-
mmended by the ITdegwa Commission (Kenya Government 1971a: 
1 1 3 , 1 1 6 ) . These difficulties are, however, relative to 
definition of the tasks to be carried out. I f a high 
degree of innovation, both procedural and substantive, is 
colled for from the.lower -levels of administration it will 
not be forthcoming. If, - h o w e v e r t h e innovative'effort is 
concentrated on devising and introducing procedures which 
seek to optimise the performance of existing staff, perhaps 
w i t h limited training, then worthwhile results might "he 
obtained. Sut this could only be done through hard realism 
and through devising procedures feasible for the"'staff who 
would be required to carry them out. There is no place here 
for comprehensive intellectual perfectionism. The need is 
for sophistication in simplicity. 
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THE FPiILIACY OF PROCEDURES 
The weight of the evidence points towards a primacy 
of procedures in increasing the effectiveness of rural 
development administration in general and in introducing 
area-hased planning in particular. The value of standar-
dised procedures and comparability i n planning is commonly 
emphasised for engineering activities, -.(Kulp, 1970:385; 
K a t e s , 1971:7) hut the principle can equally apply to area-
based planning. The problems experienced with the target-
setting approach to area development, with the generation 
of shopping list plans from districts and regions, and with 
development studies which have, not led to plans or imple-
mentation might have been reduced had b e t t e r systems been 
devised for them. Bat at least as important, had'there 
been careful ex ante.appraisal of the procedures proposed 
then it might have been decided that they, were not: worth 
initiating. In any future replication of SRDP area plan-
ning in Kenya,;: standardising procedures for field staff 
should enable them to play a greater part ih plan prepara-
tion, and building comparability into plan presentations 
should reduce the amount of•effort required at•the centre. 
Such measures should lower the demands on.high-level man-
power, improve the fit. between:area-based plans and natio-
nal priorities and programmes,. and make it easier for plans 
to slip through the hurdles:in central government.-
*. i * • — 
It may be objected that there are powerful social 
factors militating against the effective implementation of 
hew procedures for decentralised area-based planning.
:
 Hyden, 
for example, has described some of the social factors 
which U n i t effective rational administration in Kenya (1971) 
and Hellis has questioned the extent to which the Kenyan 
bureaucracy can be described as developmental (1971b). A 
vital assumption behind the argument of this paper is that 
local-level civil servants would work harder and be more 
productive if they were given tasks which were more demon-
strably developmental and from which.they could derive the 
satisfactions of achievement. Certainly there are some indi-
cations that a lack of clear developmental tasks and proce-
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dures limits staff motivation. Saylor and Livingstone 
suggest that it is possible.that local-level officers 
"grope in the dark in the absence of policies they can 
execute" (1969:20). Gertzel found that one of the reasons 
for the early failure; of development committees i n Kenya 
w a s that members .had "little clear idea about the real 
nature of their functions" (1970:14). It is arguable, 
t o o , that her finding that administrative officers in Kenya 
in the period 1965-68 preferred the public baraza and 
publicising plans and mobilising people to disciplined* 
coordination and implementation through development commi-
•ttees (1970:20,27) stems partly from the lack of defini-
tion of the work the committees were meant to undertake. 
W h e r e staff have developmental activities which are rou-
tinised, enforced, and visibly effective (for instance, 
the staff in Kenya engaged on land consolidation or tea-
extension) they tend to work w e l l . As Hyden has written, 
"A stronger task•orientation is unlikely to develop spon-
u an e ou sly unless individuals are given tasks over which they ha 
a full grasp; which they can develop into something better 
and be proud of." (1971:11). The field staff of the East 
African governments represent a major underutilised resour-
ce; but devising procedural systems to realise that resource 
is liable to be a complex, long drawn out and indeed inti-
m i d a t i n g una ert alcing. 
If decentralised area-based planning is' pursued, 
certain principles can be recommended for "its design on 
the basis of experience, so far. First, the Introduction 
of _jjxwueuu.rea should be gradual and experimental, tested 
in a few areas and modified before being generally applied. 
Second, the procedures themselves should be simple, with 
optional loops into complexity to be followed depending 
on planning and implementing capacity, the time scale, 
the types, quantity and quality of data, and degrees of 
-uncertainty and risk, in the programmes being developed. 
A n algorithm might provide the-best guide through the 
system. Third, over-attention to the early operations in 
the planning-implorienting sequence should be avoided, es-
pecially tendencies towards pathological data-collection 
without regard to its potential u s e . The concept of optimal 
ignorance night he developed, with techniques for identi-
fying #hat are the relative costs and benefits of acqui-
ring different types of information in different types of 
situation. Fourth, implementability should be a prime 
criterion of good planning. Indeed, in preparing area plans 
a backwards approach - taking existing programmes and begin-
ning by phasing and replanning them - could be combined 
with the introduction of new programmes. These recomme-
ndations amount to a proposal for a gradual and experimen-
tal building-up of simple operations which can be evaluated 
for effectiveness, but they need not exclude more complex 
approaches providing they too are tried on a limited scale 
and treated as experiments. What is important is gaining 
a range of experience with different techniques in differ-
ent conditions, so that there are alternative approaches 
available for future choices. 
To develop, test and modify procedures for area-based 
planning would seem to require a combination of research, 
consultancy and training: research to identify the present 
situation, its constraints and opportunities; consultancy 
to devise experimental procedures; and.training to introduce 
them. Such work has to be multi-disciplinary: the skills 
and insights of the environmental sciences, geography, agri-
culture, economics, and sociology are certainly required. 
The position of public administration and political science 
as academic disciplines with a potential contribution is 
more debateable. Commentators from these disciplines tend 
to agree that procedures should be worked out (Cliffe and 
Saul, 1969:36; Collins, 1970:42; and Pratt, 1967:46-7) 
but they stop short of presenting detailed proposals them-
selves. There may be many reasons for this: a sense that 
this is the work of the civil service; the relative invisi-
bility of procedural details; lack of accees in some cases; 
and perhaps a preference for more general issues rather than 
what may be regarded as the rather dull detail of Authori-
ties to Incur Expenditure, Local Purchase Orders, and similar 
parts of government routine. Some relevant techniques are 
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those developed for organisation and nethods and opera-
tional research. Bat these have tended to he associated 
w i t h management consultancy and management training more 
t h a n w i t h university departments of government and politi-
cal science. Students of public administration ojid poli-
tical science may indeed"he able to help as critical 
observers, i n evaluating, and in assisting exchanges 
of techniques, experiences and insights within East Africa; 
b u t in the initial design of procedures civil servants and 
professional "management consultants may have more to contri-
b u t e . 
The question remains where the Innovative ideas and 
drive should come from. This is important in that the 
staff concerned should' have suitable experience, receive 
official support and be free from distractions. There are 
arguments for and against institutes or bureaus of develop-
m e n t studies,-university departments, training institutes, 
management consultants, and government departments. In 
K e n y a , if the Ndegwa Commission's recommendation for a 
Management Services Division of a Central Management Office 
i s adopted, this might eventually provide a suitable home 
since it would.be charged with rendering management services 
and consultancy to ministries. (For a full description of-
its proposed functions, see Kenya Government, 1971a:143-4). 
The SRDP experience and experience with area-based planning 
elsevfhcre docs, however, indicate that to innovate procedures 
requires much effort and skill. If the nations of East 
Africa are seriously to experiment further in developing 
and extending area-based planning, the best immediate policy-
i s probably to exploit whatever resources are currently 
available; but this should be accompanied by recruiting and 
training personnel both to design and test procedures and 
to carry out area-based planning and implementation in the 
f u t u r e . 
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PLANNING FOR RURAL AREAS IN 




The 1970s have begun with mounting interest in decentralising planning and 
in preparing and implementing plans for specific rural areas in East Africa. 
In Uganda an interministerial committee has been set up for a proposed pro-
gramme for integrated rural development for eighteen separate gombololas 
(sub-countries). In Tanzania decentralisation has been sought through the 
Regional Development Fund and through the intended work of Regional 
Economic Secretaries. In addition, the programme of encouraging movement 
mlo^ujamaa villages in Dodoma amounts to an attempt at a comprehensive area 
development programme (Rwegayura, 1971) which might become a prototype 
for similar endeavours elsewhere. There has been imich recent discussion of 
regional planning in Tanzania (for instance Saylor and Livingstone, 1969; 
Berry and others, 1971; Tortlecko and Davies, 1971) ancfcthe third volume of the 
Second Five-Year Plan was devoted to an attempt to decentralise and dis-
aggregate to the regional level (Tanzania Government, 1970). In Kenya, regional 
physical plans have been completed or are nearly complete for the seven 
% provinces; the Special Rural Development Programme (S?RDP) has generated 
multi-sectoral programmes for six divisions (sub-districts) and preparatory 
studies for several others; and the Ndegwa Commission has recommended that 
both plan-making and plan-implementing be extended down to the level of the 
district and even of the division (Kenya Government, 1971a: 112). 
While this is by no means a full review of the interest in developing 
decentralised planning, it may serve to justify the attempt which follows to 
assess some of the experience gained in the 1960s and more recently, to examine 
•Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, formerly 
District Officer in Kenya and Lecturer and Research Officer at the Kenya Institute of Admi-
nistration and the East African Staff College. 
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explanations for the levels of performance achieved, and to derive prescriptions 
for the future. In doing this it is necessary to narrow the field of concern. 
Decentralised planning presents a complex network of problems and oppor-
tunities which it is not within the competence of any one discipline to handle. 
This paper does not consider in any detail either regional physical planning 
or sectoral planning, for instance for roads, water, or agriculture at decentralised 
levels. It is concerned rather with area-based planning, defined as planning 
and plan implementation with participation by local-level staff of multi-sector 
programmes for specific rural areas. The main focus is on the district and sub-
district levels. Most attention is paid to Tanzania and Kenya: to Tanzania 
because it is relatively well-documented, and to Kenya because of the experience 
gained with the SRDP (for example Nellis and others, 1970; Chambers, 1970; 
Kang'ela, 1971; Gerhart, 1971; Hungate, 1971). 
A further limitation of scope must be made explicit: this paper does not 
confront the question of alternatives to area-based planning. It is all too easy 
to make the facile assumption that any planning is better than no planning. 
A decision to plan, however, is a decision to use planning resources, and in 
intention at least, resources for implementation, and these have opportunity 
costs. Important questions, to be answered only in terms of the particular 
conditions of particular nations and the national priorities which they set, 
are first, what forms of planning at what levels are desirable, and second, 
a question which is rarely or never put in East Africa, whether in some circum-
stances non-planning may be preferable to planning. The justification for omit-
ting these questions here is that answering them will be easier when the feasi-
bility of one of the alternatives, area-based planning, has been explored in more 
detail. Such exploration, concerned primarily with administrative aspects, is 
the purpose of this paper. 
PLANNING WITHOUT IMPEMENTATION 
Area-based planning and implementation in East Africa has a long record 
of failure which has, however, been inconspicuous, partly because of its dispersed 
nature. The impression from the evidence available is that many area-based 
rural development activities fall into two main categories: planning without 
implementation, and implementation without planning. While any attempt at a 
summary inevitably oversimplifies, the former category appears to include 
three main types of operations: target-setting, preparing shopping lists, and 
development studies. 
Target-setting was much discussed during the mid-1960s. The idea current 
was that the activities and effectiveness of local-level staff could be enhanced 
through disaggregating to local levels some of the targets set in national plans. 
In Kenya, the first development plan stated that the government would define 
regional and district targets as soon as possible (Kenya Government, 1964, 
p. 136). President Kenyatta told a development seminar for politicians and 
civil servants in 1965 that civil servants' merits would be judged by their contri-
132 ROBERT CHAMBERS 
bution to the development plan and they would be called upon to explain any 
failure to achieve their targets (Kenya Institute for Administration, 1965). 
The second development plan set agricultural production targets by district 
for some of the main crops but these were given for the end of the five-year 
period and not broken down into annual totals (Kenya Government, 1966, 
appendix tables 10-21). In fact only the Ministry of Agriculture was able to 
provide district targets during the period up to the end of 1968 (Gertzel, 1970, 
p. 14) and it is doubtful whether these were often taken very seriously. In 
Tanzania more was attempted. During the first five-year plan period sectoral 
targets were disaggregated to the regions, but the regions were all set the same 
sectoral growth rates as those for the nation as a whole (Karmiloff, 1965:86). 
The unrealistic assumptions of this procedure coupled with the almost complete 
absence of a professional economic planning competence at regional levels 
made this a largely meaningless exercise. Crop production targets were produced 
after some consultation with Regional Development Committees and other 
bodies, and were meant to be disaggregated from regional to district level. 
There were, however, differences of opinion as to whether targets were realistic, 
and as Cliffe and Saul have pointed out, the regional planning of which this was 
the major component was largely a paper exercise (1969, p. 34-35). In some cases 
local bodies, full of initial enthusiasm, set high agricultural production targets 
for themselves (Bienen, 1967, p. 328-329) and these became translated through 
non-technical channels into calls to increase acreages, regardless of labour 
constraints at peak periods and of the Ministry of Agriculture's policies of 
propagating better methods of husbandry to increase yields rather then increase 
acreages. In the event the targets were not always known at the local level, 
and where kno-\yn do not appear to have had much meaning in terms of staff 
activity and performance. As a result of the intervention of exogenous factors 
such as weather and world prices, some areas exceeded and others fell short 
of their targets. In addition, procedures had not been worked out for reporting 
on progress. The target approach, indeed, had never been throughly worked 
out as a system, and amounted to little more than a crude and ineffective 
attempt to provide local-level staff with an incentive for higher performance 
in the administrative areas in which they were working. Following these dis-
couraging experiences, it is not surprising that in the later 1960s target-setting 
lost some of its earlier prominence. 
The second form of planning without implementation was the preparation 
of shopping lists of proposals. In Kenya in 1963-64 during the period of region-
alism, a number of regional agricultural plans which were in effect project 
lists were submitted to government. Again, in preparation for the second 
national plan, districts submitted compilations of programmes and projects, 
but these like the regional agricultural plans before them were regarded with 
despair by central government staff and were not incorporated in the planning 
process. In Tanzania there have been similar experiences: the Mwanza, Dodoma 
and Mbeya plans produced in preparation for the second five-year plan have 
been described as 'essentially shopping lists' and contained some unrealistic 
assumptions in relation to national targets and financial availability (Berry and 
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others, 1971: 25-26). In practice, 'bottom-up' planning of this sort has been 
a competition between areas for resources. Far f rom simplifying central planning, 
the tendency has been to overbid in relation to likely resource availability, to 
complicate the tasks in the centre, making the locally prepared plans difficult 
to use, and to contribute to disillusion and cynism among field staff when their 
efforts lead to no result. 
A third form of planning without implementation consists of development 
studies which stop short of detailed action proposals and which would require 
further working up before they could become implementable. In Kenya, 
development studies carried out in 1970-71 by Norwegian planners in Kitui 
District fall into this category. They compile information about the district 
and present general proposals for development, but they do not include detailed 
proposals with programming and costing. Studies conducted in the eight second-
phase SRDP areas in Kenya to varying degrees also have not been carried 
through into detailed proposals. (For some of the data collected, see Heyer, 
Ireri and Moris, 1971.) In Tanzania, the Geita District Plan prepared by a 
French team with Devplan personnel has been described as 'essentially a 
compilation of data regarding the district rather than a planning document ' 
(Saylor and Livingstone, 1969:8), and the Kilimanjaro plan prepared by the 
regional planning team of Devplan has been said to provide data and perspec-
tives for the formulation of a plan but not to attempt to design an implement-
able programme (Berry and others, 1971:24). The most extreme example of 
studies without proposals is the work carried out in Rungwe District by the 
Afrika Studiecentrum, Leyden, which absorbed 155 man months of highly 
qualified research staff, and on the practical side (however valuable the studies 
may be academically) apparently produced little more than a 'tentative list of 
feasibility studies' (Berry and others, 1971:24 and 41). It would, of course, be 
unfair to ignore the fact that some studies, like those in Rungwe, are conducted 
with largely academic aims, or that the findings from such studies do often feed 
into policy decisions and so have practical results even if they do not lead to 
plans for the areas in which they were carried out. Nevertheless these examples, 
which are by no means a complete catalogue, do suggest that there has been 
a waste of resources in the past, and that future proposals for studies for area-
based planning should be scrutinised to improve the chances of their leading 
to implementable plans. The need is for carefully devised and enforced proce-
dures to reduce the resources required in data collection and to increase the 
resources devoted to programming, budgeting and implementation. 
While there has been area-based planning activity without implementation, 
it is salutary to recognise that meanwhile there has been extensive implement-
ation without area-based planning. The implementation of departmental 
sectoral programmes, of national policies such as ujamaa vijijini in Tanzania, 
and of local authority programmes have continued and usually grown in scale. 
Decentralised allocations of funds—for self-help in Kenya, for the Regional 
Development Fund (RDF) in Tanzania, and for the district development fund 
in Uganda before the coup—have been spent by and through local level officials, 
though with mixed results. (See Collins, 1970, for the RDF) Meanwhile the 
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ground swell of self-help, often outside any planning process and often in conflict 
with national priorities (see Mbithi 1970, p. 19 and Anderson 1971, p. 19 for 
Kenya) has pre-empted decisions through the collection of funds and through 
construction work, sometimes with disregard for technical criteria 
(Holmquist, 1970). In practice the real allocation of development resources 
that is implemented, at the local level, has been determined not by systematic 
area-based planning in which there is a careful assessment of potential, 
problems and opportunities, but through a mixture of national and departme-
ntal priorities, the ideas and preferences of individual civil servants, political 
lobbying, pre-emptive self-help, and the relative capacities of departments 
to execute their policies. For Kenya at least it is generally true that in the 
words of Robert Jackson 'Planning at the grassroots level. . . is still largely a 
formal exercise which has not ye t . . . significantly affected local development 
activities which take place in spite of planning' (Jackson 1970 p. 199) 
PLANNING WITH IMPLEMENTATION 
There are however two types of exception to Jackson's generalisation 
which, in view of the usual gap between planning and implementation at the 
area level, should be examined. In the first place, settlement and ranching 
schemes in Kenya, without a fanfare and without being formally described as 
area-based planning or embodied in any documents which could be described 
as area plans, have entailed the following activities: resources and human surveys, 
physical and agricultural planning, infrast'ructural development, the provision 
of economic and welfare services and the promotion and development of 
institutions—which would be expected in a multi-sectoral area development 
programme. The settlements of the National Irrigation Board at Mwea, Perke-
rra and Ahero, the Million-Acre Settlement Scheme, and the group ranching 
schemes in Masailand have all in common the introduction, or the intention 
to introduce, radical economic and social change in specified rural areas. The 
experience which these approaches have gathered may well repay closer study 
by future designers of area-based planning, but two particular circumstances 
should be borne in mind. In the first place, these operations have been accom-
pained by a change in the organisation of land use and in the farmer's or 
pastoralist's relationship with the land. This has both required and facilitated 
the second circumstance, a special organisation—the National Irrigation Board, 
the Department of Settlement and the Range Management Division of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, respectively—with an exceptional degree of responsi-
bility for and control over economic and to a lesser extent social activities and 
rewards. These organisations have related to and depended upon the Provincial 
Administration and other departments, but have enjoyed a degree of autonomy 
and power at the local level for which there are no equivalents in the great 
majority of small-holding and pastoral situations in Kenya. 
The second example is more important since it represents an attempt 
to produce and implement area plans in areas which have been and which remain 
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subject to normal administration, - working as far as possible through the 
existing machinery of government. The history of the SRDP up to mid-1971 
has been recorded elsewhere (Nellis 1970a, 1971a). Suffice it here to state that 
following a conference on education, employment and rural development 
held at Kericho in 1966 (the papers of which were published as Sheffield, ed., 
1967), a long series of initiatives led in 1968 to the selection and survey of four-
teen divisions (sub-districts) in Kenya considered to be representative of small-
farming and to a lesser degree pastoral conditions, the preparation in 1969 and 
1970 of multi-sectoral and to some extent experimental development plans 
for six of these (Migori in South Nyanza; Vihiga in Kakamega; Kapenguria in 
West Pokot ; Tetu in Nyeri; Mbere in Embu; and parts of Kwale District), the 
recruitment of donors to finance and provide technical assistance for these 
(FAO/SIDA for Migori; US AID for Vihiga; the Dutch government for 
Kapenguria; none — the Kenya Government in effect — for Tetu; N O R A D 
for Mbere; and the British for Kwale), and the beginnings of implementation 
in the first half of 1971. The driving force behind the programme was at first 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and is now, since the 
amalgamation of that Ministry with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Finance and Planning. A small secretariat in that Ministry has developed a 
system of linkmen in ministries and has worked through the Provincial Planning 
Officers, the Provincial Administration, and the operational department at the 
central government, province, district and division levels to prepare and gain 
acceptance for the plans and more recently to initiate implementation. Officers 
of the Provincial Administration known as Area Coordinators, one to each 
area, have been charged with coordinating and expediting the programmes. 
Although it is early to assess progress, a good deal of experience has been 
gained and some light has been thrown on the problems and possibilities of 
decentralised planning activities involving local-level staff. Historical descrip-
tions of the planning process in five of the six areas (see Oyugi, 1970 for 
Migori; Moock, 1970 for Vihiga; Nellis 1970b, for Kapenguria; Brokensha, 
1970 for Mbere; and Kang'ela, 1971 for Kwale) demonstrate that the sequence 
of initiatives, the degrees of participation by local-level staff, and the contribu-
tions of Nairobi and provincial personnel have varied between areas. The 
patterns and experience have, however, been sufficiently similar for some 
generalisations to be possible. (For fuller presentation of lessons learnt, see 
Chambers, 1970). Four linked aspects appear important for future area planning. 
In the first place, the six area plans were produced through repeated injections 
of inititative and imagination from Provincial Planning Officers and from 
Nairobi staff. Provincial, district and divisional staff contributed information, 
ideas and insights by most of the detailed planning was carried out either by 
people who came from outside the district or by district and divisional staff 
catalysed and encouraged by the presence of such people. The generation of 
experimental ideas, their working up into programmes, negotiations for their 
acceptance in central government, and then their implementation have proved 
to require considerably greater inputs of high-level staff time and effort than 
might have been anticipated. The experimental programmes—village polytech-
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nics, labour-intensive road construction, extension and farm management 
experiments, maize credit, cotton blocks, 4K clubs, and so on—could not have 
been realised without substantial assistance f rom highlevel manpower from out-
side the divisions and districts concerned. 
Secondly, this reflects much less on the capabilities of local-level staff than on 
the environment in which they find themselves and their rational responses to it. 
They are cynical about planning: they quote past examples of planning without 
implementation, of initiatives which have stuck in the machine in Nairobi, and 
of delays in fund releases even when these are routine. They also have a low 
expectation of being in the same post when any plans they prepare come forward 
for implementation. This is partly because of the expected duration of processing 
the plans, and partly because of the rates of transfer. In seven SRDP districts 
and divisions surveyed in July 1970, District Commissioners had been in their 
districts for an average of 6 i months and District Officers for an average of only 
3 i months. During a little over a year during which there have been Area 
Coordinators there have been changes in incumbents in four out of the six 
areas. In these circumstances there is a low incentive to learn about an area or 
to initiate development action which will require more than a few months to 
mature. The focus on immediately realisable self-help activities can thus be 
understood partly as reflecting a desire by local-level staff for useful activity 
which they can most easily achieve in the short-term outside the normal oper-
ation of government development procedures. Local-level staff are thus the 
captives of a syndrome of rapid transfers, low expectations of continuity in 
post, low incentives to initiate longer-term developmental activities, and the 
expectation that the operation of routine government procedures will be 
lengthy. 
A third point highlighted by the SRDP experience is that the main admini-
strative bottleneck in the Kenya Government is in Nairobi rather than in the 
field. This had long been recognised by field officers and part of the purpose 
of the SRDP, — to sharpen and make more effective the machinery of govern-
m e n t — implies attempting to overcome this. It has however recurred with the 
S R D P because of the smallness of the secretariat responsible for it and the 
magnitude of the difficulties of generating proposals and then processing 
them, whether prepared in central government or in the field. For example, 
when develcpment studies are carried out in the field without their being 
worked through into action proposals with realistic requests for resources, 
they present a problem to tne secretarial requiring effort and innovation to 
solve. In the press of events it is the better prepared proposals or those which 
fit best into existing programmes which receive priority. The non-impleme-
ntation of plans derives partly from the inappropriate forms in which they are 
presented to the centre, which in turn stems from the difficulties experienced 
in the centre in innovating standardised forms in which proposals should be 
presented so that they can slip quickly and easily through the machine. 
The fourth, most important and perhaps most obvious lesson which can 
be derived f rom the SRDP experience, as f rom examples of planning in many 
countries, is that implementability is the crux of good planning. Indeed 
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improving programme implementation is regarded as one of the main 
objectives of the SDRP. It is doubtful whether a statement like Pratt 's about 
Tanzania 's first Five-Year Plan, that it was 'an able and highly professional 
document ' (Pratt, 1967, p. 38), can be justified unless the professionalism 
includes sufficient insight into the conditions of implementation for the 
plan to be put into practice. (See Leys, 1969, pp. 273-4 for a discussion 
of the first Tanzania Five Year Plan's non-implementable character.) It 
should be axiomatic that a 'good' plan which cannot be implemented is in 
fact a bad plan. In the case of SRDP first-phase area plans, working 
them from proposals through to scheduled action programmes has proved 
difficult, time-consuming and a sharp discipline in feasibility testing (for details 
of the system, see Belshaw and Chambers, 1971). Working out who does what, 
when and how and with what resources, has revealed incompatibilities in 
proposed resource use, particularly with agricultural staff time, forcing confron-
tation with choices which would otherwise have remained unrecognised and 
would have been pre-empted by the structure and inertia of the situation. 
Testing implementability should thus become a part of area-based planning. 
The implication is that planning resources and activities have tended to be 
concentrated on the earlier activities of the sequence of planning implemention 
to the neglect of the later ones. One reason may be that plan documents are 
sometimes felt to represent the culmination of planning operations, whether 
on a national or local level, and plan documents do not normally include 
detailed action programmes. But good planning should include planning 
implementation. 
COMMON DIAGNOSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS 
In the light of the experience with area-based planning without implement-
ation, area-based planning with implementation, and other evidence, some of 
the more conventional diagnoses and prescriptions for rural development 
administration can now be examined. Low levels of performance in develop-
mental roles are commonly attributed among other factors, to inappropriate 
structures, lack of coordination, lack of entrepreneurial and problem-solving 
attitudes in the civil service, and lack of trained manpower. These diagnoses and 
their associated prescriptions will be considered in turn. 
Defects in administration are often attributed to missing, faulty or 
inappropriate structures, or their incorrect location in government. Until the 
later 1960s there was much debate in East Africa about 'where planning should 
be put '—whether in the President's Office, or as a separate Ministry, or as 
a department of a Ministry of Finance. Discussion continues about the location 
of certain departments—community development and water development in 
particular—and these tend, in both Kenya and Tanzania, to suffer a peripatetic 
life; the Water Development Department in Tanzania was in three different 
ministries during the preparation of the Northeast Nzega Plan (Berry and others, 
1971, p. 26). Such questions are undoubtedly important ; as Rweyemamu (1966) 
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has shown, for example, there can be a significant structural aspect to the 
absorption of civil servants' energies in inter-agency rivalry and conflict. But 
the relative importance of such questions has perhaps tended to be exaggerated. 
To borrow from a phrase of Kang'ela's, concentrating attention on structural 
changes in government may be like the man who lost his watch in a dark street 
and looked for it in his bedroom because that was where he could turn the light 
on. It is easy to recommend changes in structure. Academic commentators 
and short-term consultants alike, often not understanding in any depth the 
operations of government departments, are easily tempted to suggest macro-
organisational changes rather than micro-adjustments to make the system work. 
Indeed, the fluency with which the Tanzanian government changes its ministries 
and departments may be a symptom of evasion of the need not for structural 
change but for means to improve the working of what already exists. Applied 
to area-based planning this argument implies that it may be less important to 
create special organisations than to develop procedures for making use of those 
which are already operating. The process of interstitial penetration and catalysis 
devised for the SRDP, relying on incremental modification of procedures and 
behaviour, may be more effective than more visible and more easily prescribed 
changes in organisational structure. 
The most common diagnosis of weaknesses in rural development admini-
stration is, however, lack of coordination, typically followed by a call for more 
coordination. (This is explicit or implicit in Junod, 1969; Cliffe and Saul, 1969; 
the Ndegwa Commission Report ; Pratt, 1967; and Berry and Conyers, 1971, 
p. 12). Certainly many cases can be cited (for example, see Junod, 1969) of 
lack of cooperation between staff of different departments. But 'coordination' 
is a vague term and is in practice used to cover a number of different purposes. 
It is probably no coincidence that calls for coordination come most loudly from 
departments which are insecure and need cooperation, such as community 
development, or planning in its early days. Nor is it surprising that Gertzel 
found that District Officers in Kenya said when asked about their developmental 
work that their task was to 'coordinate' but were vague about what was involved 
(1970: fn 36). Again, an analysis of the use of the term in the paper by Cliffe 
and Saul on the district development front in Tanzania suggests that they use 
coordination to describe pursuing the socialist strategy which they advocate 
(1969, passim but especially 1-2, 10-12, and 34-36). 
The very vagueness of the term 'coordination' which makes it useful to 
community developers, planners, District Officers in Kenya and socialists in 
Tanzania alike also allows a use of syntax which can be interpreted to imply 
that more coordination is necessarily beneficial and that maximum coordination 
is best of all. Some quotations may serve to illustrate this usage. 
Cliffe and Saul: The general strategy of the Tanzania leadership has as its 
most salient features: 
The intention to coordinate as closely and as frutifully as 
possible the activities of all institutions with a presence in the 
Tanzania countryside. 
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A continuing effort to streamline the functions of District 
Development Committees and to maximize effective coor-
dination is obviously a major priority. (1969, pp. 1 and 34.) 
Berry and Conyers: Of water development planning: 
We envisage that in most cases there will be close coordination 
between the planning teams and the various ministries at all 
planning stages, so that as wide a group as possible are involved 
in the planning process. (1971, p. 12. My italics) 
Ndegwa Commission Report: 
. . . . there is a widespread feeling that coordination of the 
many aspects of government activity must be improved to get 
maximum results. . . . Here we consider the overall problem 
of structure to ensure maximum coordination of these various 
organisations towards meeting the nation's development 
goals. (Kenya Government, 1971a, p. 110) 
Implicit in all these statements is the assumption that in some respects at least 
coordination should be maximised. There may here be a bias, especially in the 
Tanzanian case, towards coordination because of a national preference for 
cooperative activity; indeed there is a harmony of models of human behaviour 
between the ideals of communal production in ujamaa villages and the coope-
ration of the teams of specialists who plan and service them. Planners also have 
a tendency to prefer those rural projects (settlement schemes, ranching schemes) 
which, f rom the nature of the combination of inputs required, generate a need 
for coordinated programming and implementation (see for instance Millikan, 
1967). Such preferences should not, however, be allowed to obscure the fact 
that coordination is not costless, and that there is no general a priori reason 
why alternatives to coordination should always be less beneficial, by whatever 
criteria. 
Coordination has, indeed, in most of its forms, high costs in staff time. 
Coordination is liable to many meetings, staff sitting through discussions which 
do not concern them, and in its more pathological forms listening to speeches, 
failing to make decisions, hiding from responsibility for inactivity behind 
a group consensus, and agreeing on technically poor programmes. Two related 
examples may illustrate the potential costs of coordination. Collins states 
(1970, p. 17) that compartmentalism of ministerial operations in the regions in 
Tanzania and lack of cooperation with other agencies limit the effectiveness of 
the Regional Development Committee as a unit for the planned allocation and 
coordinated implementation of the Regional Development Fund. He finds 
a certain 'technocratic arrogance' in the case of cooperation over implementation 
of R D F projects, as when one head of a water development organisation be-
moaned 'squandering' his staff over lots of small-village schemes. Given scarce 
resources for implementation, however, the choice here is likely to have been 
between being uncoordinated (choosing the technically easiest areas and sup-
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plying more people with water) and coordinated (choosing the areas selected on 
political and other grounds and supplying fewer people). A second, related 
example can be taken from current dilemmas in water development in Kenya. 
Executive capacity and not finance is the main constraint, as is suggested by the 
fact that in 1969/70 of an original estimate for development expenditure on 
rural water supplies of K£525,000 only K£253,000 was spent (Kenya Govern-
ment, 1971b, p. 243). In designing water schemes, consultation and coordin-
ation at the local level are often called for, but they absorb the time of the 
engineers who are the bottleneck in the whole process, and therefore have 
high opportunity costs in terms of total numbers of people provided with water. 
The choice may well be between more coordination and less water, and less 
coordination and more water. 
The implication of this argument is that coordination may sometimes be 
dysfunctional and should be optimised rather than maximised. What form it 
should take—whether the passing of information, joint planning, development 
committee meetings, joint field visits, unified reporting systems, or whatever— 
needs to be decided upon the merits of particular case and according to explicit 
criteria. Enough should have been said to make it evident that blanket calls for 
more coordination should be regarded critically and broken down into separate 
activities, the costs and benefits of each of which can then be appraised. In the 
case of area-based planning the optimal degree of joint acti vity between depart-
ments varies with circumstances. There may be no operational connection and 
therefore no need for coordination between, let us say, a rural domestic water 
programme and a maize extension programme; but self-help dips programmes 
in Kenya require joint planning and replanning between the local representatives 
of the Division of Animal Husbandry, the Department of Community Develop-
ment, the Provincial Administration and self-help groups. A listing of the 
operations required for a programme such as this, including who is responsible 
for what quickly identifies the joint activities required, and joint phasing of 
these activities by the officers concerned should help to cement commitment to 
the programme (Belshaw and Chambers, 1971, pp. 8-9). Optimal coordination 
may best be obtained by ad hoc cooperative activity based on the stage of 
planning and implementation and the particular programme concerned, 
combined with a standardisation of procedures to reduce the cost of coordination 
in staff time spent in discussion and in the innovation required for working 
out operations in the absence of clear guidelines. For example, Kates has 
observed about the approaches to producing water development plans: 
Comparability between plans has been enhanced when the terms of reference suggest a 
standard set of sub-regional units, when major economic and demographic projects are 
centrally provided, and when a common set of design standards and assumptions are 
adopted. Building-in consistency this way seems more effective than the use of coordinating 
or liaison committees which in practice seldom seem to function well (1971, p. 7). 
Put another way, as a means of securing desirable coordination, standardisation 
of procedures may be preferable to meetings which have to innovate relation-
ships. 
A further diagnosis and prescription is that civil servants lack initiative and 
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should develop entrepreneurial qualities. Bienen, for example, suggests that 
entrepreneurship is needed on the part of Regional Commissioners in Tanzania 
(1967, p. 332); but the other side of the coin is that the achievement drives of 
Regional Commissioners have led them sometimes to hasty and authoritarian 
initiation of projects and continued support for them even when they are 
economically unviable (Cliffe and Saul, 1969, pp. 6-7). The issues here are not 
simple. A common model in commentators ' minds is that the civil service is 
hidebound with rules and regulations, and innovation is only possible through 
initiatives outside the sytem. The R D F in Tanzania can be seen in this light: 
the provision of a resource not constrained by a dead weight of controls inhibiting 
its use. Although the R D F evidently has benefits, some of its short-comings 
have been associated with the very autonomy of resource allocation which is 
its virtue. (Collins, 1970, passim). In Kenya, extra-system developmental 
initiatives by civil servants have included self-help activities, in this case some-
times taking the form of compulsory exactions of contributions carried out by 
the Provincial Administration (Nyangira, 1970, p. 10). Thus, in both Tanzania 
and Kenya extra-system initiative has shown a tendency toward authoritarian 
forms. A preferable approach may be to modify the existing system of procedures 
so that it provides more scope and rewards for developmental initiative. 
A relative issue here is the tendency for thinking about the role of the civil 
service, even indeed of the development administration which is desired, in terms 
of problem-solving. Thus the Ndegwa Commission report: 'A good civil service 
in a developing country must . . . . have the capacity to identify and solve 
specific kinds of problems—problems of inducing and sustaining social and 
economic change in addition to the already formidable task of efficient manage-
ment of the services for which it is now responsible.' (Kenya Government, 
1971a, pp. 2-3). Similarly, Heyer in part of her acute paper on choice in the 
S R D P planning process writes: 'The detailed goals for any particular area are 
related to its problems, and probably the easiest way of formulating goals is 
through consideration of fundamental problems first.' (Heyer, 1971, p. 4). 
In like vein, Berry and others say of the Mwanza, Mbeya and Dodoma plans 
that they 'were drawn together from sets of projects suggested by the District 
Development Committees and Village Development Committees and thus 
clearly contained the important problem areas as seen through local eyes.' 
(1971, p. 23). But as Drucker has pointed out in the field of management: 
'Results are obtained by exploiting opportunities, not by solving problems.' 
(1964, p. 18). 
While this statement is oversimple, and while the quotations from the three 
sources above do not do the authors full justice, the point is not mere semantics. 
Civil servants can very easily be problem-oriented in their attitudes and activities; 
indeed the continuing emphasis on law and order, however necessary, has 
a problem-preventing and problem-solving character. Moreover, the programmes 
of technical departments can be biased by uncritical attempts to solve problems. 
T o take one example, cotton had done consistently badly in Kenya despite 
repeated efforts to expand acreage; the response of the Ministry of Agriculture 
has been to redouble efforts to persuade farmers to grow it rather than to look 
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for alternatives. In cases such as these, resource allocations are determined by 
difficulties that arise. Far f rom this always being the desirable creativity wel-
comed by Hirschman as part of his theory of the Hiding Hand in development 
(Hirschman, 1967) it may have high and unjustifiable costs through draining 
effort and resources into activities which are less beneficial than their alternatives. 
An opportunity-orientation could be much more productive. In area-based 
planning for instance one of the first steps to be taken by an agriculturalist 
(as rarely if ever happened with the first round of SRDP planning) would be to 
visit agricultural research stations to find out what new crop varieties might 
be available and what opportunities were presented by research results already 
obtained. Similarly, in land utilisation the emphasis would be on making fuller 
use of under-utilised resources. Activities such as these, innovative though 
they are in their implications, could be promoted by making them part of 
standard procedures for area-based planning. 
The final diagnosis of the difficulties of decentralised and area-based planning 
to be considered here is lack of high-level manpower. For Tanzania, Saylor and 
Livingstone consider the lack of skilled manpower capable of properly planning 
and evaluating projects to be 'perhaps the most crucial limiting factor in the sub-
national planning process' (1969, p. 17), and Cliffe and Saul describe it as 
among the most unyielding parameters of the current situation' 1969, p. 37). 
For Kenya, Belshaw has recently written: 'Since applied-economics competence 
plus rural orientation is a very scarce reasource in Kenya, considerable ingenuity 
in resource use will be required if district planning is to be a productive activity.' 
(1971, pp. 9-10). Certainly in Tanzania and Kenya there has been difficulty 
over a number of years in recruiting suitably qualified Regional Economic 
Secretaries and Provincial Planning Officers respectively. Moreover, in Kenya 
there seems no prospect of early recruitment and training of the District Deve-
lopment Officers and District Planning Officers recommended by the Ndegwa 
Commission (Kenya Government 1971a, pp. 113, 116). These difficulties are, 
however, relative to definition of the tasks to be carried out. If a high degree 
'of innovation, both procedural and substantive, is called for from the lower 
levels of administration it will not be forthcoming. If, however, the innovative 
effort is concentrated on devising and introducing procedures which seek to 
optimise the performance of existing staff, perhaps with limited training, then 
worthwhile results might be obtained. But thiscould only be done through hard 
realism and through devising procedures feasible for the staff who would be 
required to carry them out. There is no place here for comprehensive intellectual 
perfectionism. The need is for sophistication in simplicity. 
T H E PRIMACY OF PROCEDURES 
The weight of the evidence points towards a primacy of procedures in increas-
ing the effectiveness of rural development administration in general and in 
introducing area-based planning in particular: The value of standardised 
procedures and comparability in planning is commonly emphasised for engineering 
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activities (Kulp, 1970, p. 385; Kates 1971, p. 7), but the principle can equally 
apply to area-based planning. The problems experienced with the target-setting 
approach to area development, with the generation of shopping list plans f rom 
districts and regions, and with development studies which have not led to plans 
or implementation, might have been reduced had better systems been devised 
for them. But at least as important, had there been careful ex ante appraisal of 
the procedures proposed then it might have been decided that they were not 
worth initiating. In any future replication of SRDP area planning in Kenya , 
standardising procedures for field staff should enable them to play a greater 
par t in plan preparation, and building comparability into plan presentations 
should reduce the amount of effort required at the centre. Such measures should 
lower the demands on high-level man-power, improve the fit between area-based 
plans and national priorities and programmes, and make it easier for p l ans 
to slip through the hurdles in central government. 
It may be objected that there are powerful social factors militating against 
the effective implementation of new procedures for decentralised area-based 
planning. Hyden, for example, has described some of the social factors which 
limit effective rational administration in Kenya (1971) and Nellis has questioned 
the extent to which the Kenyan bureaucracy can be described as developmental 
(1971b). A vital assumption behind the argument of this paper is that local-
level civil servants would work harder and be more productive if they were 
given tasks which were more demonstrably developmental and from which 
they could derive the satisfactions of achievement. Certainly there are some 
indications that a lack of clear developmental tasks and procedures limits staff 
motivation. Saylor and Livingstone suggest that it is possible that local-level 
officers 'grope in the dark in the absence of policies they can execute' (1969, 
p. 20). Gertzel found that one of the reasons for the early failure of development 
committees in Kenya was that members had 'little clear idea about the real 
nature of their functions' (1970,p. 14). It is arguable, too, that her finding that 
administrative officers in Kenya in the period 1965-68 preferred the public 
baraza (meeting) and publicising plans and mobilising people to disciplined 
coordination and implementation through development committees (1970, 
pp. 20, 27) stems partly from the lack of definition of the work the committees 
were meant to undertake. Where staff have developmental activities which are 
routinised, enforced, and visibly effective (for instance, the staff in Kenya 
engaged on land consolidation or tea extension) they tend to work well. As 
Hyden has written: 'A stonger task orientation is unlikely to develop spon-
taneously unless individuals are given tasks over which they have a full grasp, 
which they can develop into something better and be proud of.' (1971, p. 11). 
The field staff of the East African governments represent a major under-utilised 
resource; but devising procedural systems to realise that resource is liable to 
be a complex, long drawn out and indeed intimidating undertaking. 
If decentralised area-based planning is pursued, certain principles can be 
recommended for its design on the basis of experience so far. First, the intro-
duction of procedures should be gradual and experimental, tested in a few areas 
and modified before being generally applied. Second, the procedures themselves 
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should be simple, with optional loops into complexity to be followed dependent 
on planning and implementing capacity, the time scale, the types, quanti ty 
and quality of data, and degrees of uncertainty and risk in the programmes 
being developed. An algorithm might provide the best guide through the system. 
Third, over-attention to the early operations in the planning-implementing 
sequence should be avoided, especially tendencies towards pathological data-
collection without regard for its potential use. The concept of optimal ignorance 
might be developed, with techniques for identifying what are the relative costs 
and benefits of acquiring different types of information in different types of 
situation. Fourth , implementability should be a prime criterion of good plan-
ning. Indeed, in preparing area plans a backwards approach — taking existing 
programmes and beginning by phasing and replanning them—could be com-
bined with the introduction of new programmes. These recommendat ions 
amount to a proposal for a gradual and experimental building-up of simple 
operations which can be evaluated for effectiveness, but they need not exclude 
more complex approaches providing they too are tried on a limited scale and 
treated as experiments. What is important is gaining a range of experience 
with different techniques in different conditions, so that there are alternative 
approaches available for future choices. 
T o develop, test and modify procedures for area-based planning would seem 
to require a combination of research, consultancy and training: research to 
identify the present situation, its constraints and opportunities; consultancy 
to devise experimental procedures; and training to introduce them. Such work 
has to be multi-disciplinary: the skills and insights of the environmental sciences 
—geography, agriculture, economics, and sociology—are certainly required. 
The position of public administration and political science as academic disci-
plines with a potential contribution is more debateable. Commentators f rom 
these disciplines tend to agree that procedures should be worked out (Cliffe and 
Saul, 1969, p. 36; Collins, 1970, p. 42; Pratt , 1967, pp. 46-7) but they stop short 
of presenting detailed proposals themselves. There may be many reasons for 
this: a sense that this is the work of the civil service, the relative invisibility of 
procedural details, lack of access in some cases, and perhaps a preference for 
more general issues rather than what may be regarded as the rather dull detail 
of Authorities to Incur Expenditure, Local Purchase Orders, and similar pa r t s 
of government routine. Some relevant techniques are those developed for organ-
isation and methods and operational research. But these have tended to be 
associated with management consultancy and management training more than 
with university departments of government and political science. Students of 
public administration and political science may indeed be able to help as critical 
observers, in evaluating, and in assisting exchanges of techniques, experiences 
and insights within East Africa. But in the initial design of procedures, civil 
servants and professional management consultants may have more to contribute. 
The question remains where the innovative ideas and drive should come f rom. 
This is important in that the staff concerned should have suitable experience, 
receive official support and be free f rom distractions. There are arguments for 
and against institutes or bureaus of development studies, university depart-
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ments, training institutes, management consultants, and government depart-
ments. In Kenya, if the Ndegwa Commission's recommendation for a Manage-
ment Services Division of a Central Management Office is adopted, this might 
eventually provide a suitable home since it would be charged with rendering 
management services and consultancy to ministries. (For a full description of 
its proposed functions, see Kenya Government, 1971a, pp. 143-4). The SRDP 
experience, however, as well as experience with area-based planning elsewhere, 
does indicate that to innovate procedures requires much effort and skill. If the 
nations of East Africa are seriously to experiment further in developing and 
extending area-based planning, the best immediate policy is probably to exploit 
whatever resources are currently available. But this should be accompanied by 
recruiting and training personnel both to design and test procedures and to carry 
out area-based planning and implementation in the future. 
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